

Message Text

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TO CINCLANT PRIORITY

CINCUSAFE PRIORITY

CINCUSAREUR PRIORITY

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USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH PRIORITY

USLOSACLANT PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

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EXDIS MILITARY ADEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOLLOWING REPEAT NATO 6749 ACTION SECSTATE, INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS,
MADRID, MOSCOW, MBFR DTD 09 DEC 76.

QTE: S E C R E T USNATO 6749

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF, CINCLANT, CINCUSAFE,
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E.O. 11652: X-GDS-1

TAGS: MPOL, NATO, DPC

SUBJECT: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING DECEMBER 8, 1976: RESTRICTED
SESSION

SUMMARY: DURING DECEMBER 8 RESTRICTED SESSION, DISCUSSION
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CENTERED ON THE NEED TO CONVINCE PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS THAT
THE TRENDS IN THE NATO-WARSAW PACT BALANCE ARE SERIOUS
AND REQUIRE REVERSAL. LATTANZIO (ITALY),
FEYZIOGLU (TURKISH VICE PRIME MINISTER) AND ADMIRAL SOUTO

CRUZ (PORTUGAL) STRESSED THEIR COUNTRIES' NEED FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE. SECRETARY RUMSFELD EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP AND THAT THE PROBLEM OF FINDING THE NECESSARY ADDITIONAL MONEY FOR DEFENSE REQUIRES A PROPER ORDERING OF PRIORITIES, AND AVOIDING CONVINCING OURSELVES THAT WE LACK THE CAPABILITY. SECRETARY RUMSFELD ALSO ADDRESSED ISSUES OF SURPRISE ATTACK, INTENTIONS VERSUS CAPABILITIES, AND THE NEED FOR MINISTERS TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ATTEND NATO MEETINGS. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS CREDIBLE AT PRESENT, AND THE TASK IS TO KEEP IT CREDIBLE, GIVEN THE PACE OF SOVIET IMPROVEMENTS.
END SUMMARY.

1. SYG LUNS BEGAN DECEMBER 8 RESTRICTED SESSION BY GIVING HIS REACTION TO THE DISCUSSION ON NATO DEFENSE PLANNING WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN PLENARY SESSION THE PRECEDING DAY. MINISTERS HAD SPOKEN OF THEIR FORCE PLANS, ENUMERATING SOME GRATIFYING IMPROVEMENTS; BUT THEY HAD MADE NO REAL NEW RESPONSE TO THE URGENT WARNINGS CONTAINED IN THE STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND THE FACTS PRESENTED IN THE US INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING. LUNS STRESSED THAT CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT TREND COULD OVER TIME LEAD TO EROSION OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN THE WARSAW PACT'S CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK WITH LITTLE PREPARATION, MILITARY WARNING TIME COULD BE VERY SHORT INDEED, LEAVING LITTLE TIME TO MUSTER POLITICAL RESOLVE. THIS COULD REDUCE NATO'S CHANCES FOR DEFUSING A CRISIS SITUATION. LUNS RECOGNIZED THAT MINISTERS COULD NOT TAKE DECISIONS AT THE TABLE, BUT STRESSED THAT ACTION MUST FOLLOW FROM THIS MEETING.

2. CMC HILL-NORTON SAID THAT, FRANKLY, HE HAD BEEN DEPRESSED BY THE DISCUSSION OF THE DEFENSE REVIEW ITEM THE PRECEDING DAY. THOSE MINISTERS WHO HAD SPOKEN GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEIR COUNTRIES WERE DOING
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VERY WELL INDEED. THESE PRONOUNCEMENTS CONTRASTED STARKLY WITH THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL REPORT. FURTHER, HE WAS DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED IN THE DISCUSSIONS ON INFRASTRUCTURE. THE SUMS INVOLVED WERE TRIVIAL IN COMPARISON WITH NATIONS' OVERALL DEFENSE BUDGETS, BUT MINISTERS HAD BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ONLY TO REMIT THE PROBLEM TO PERMREPS, WHO HAD ALREADY SPENT TWO YEARS ON IT WITHOUT SUCCESS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE NMAS WERE ONLY TRYING TO FOLLOW GUIDANCE SET OUT BY MINISTERS AND WERE ASKING FOR MONEY TO DO THE JOB MINISTERS HAD GIVEN THEM.

3. LUNS REMARKED THAT A MEMBER OF ONE DELEGATION HAD

COMMENTED TO HIM ON HOW SPLENDIDLY THE US HAD REACTED TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. LUNS HAD ASKED HIM HOW HE WOULD LIKE TO BE LIBERATED BY THE US AFTER A COUPLE OF YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY FAILURE OF EUROPE TO WITHSTAND THE INITIAL SHOCK? HE SAID HE KNEW THAT MINISTERS HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE US INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING AND ADDED THAT A SIMILAR NATO BRIEFING SHOULD NOW GO TO PRIME MINISTERS AND FINANCE MINISTERS.

4. DANSON (CANADA) SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE CMC'S STATEMENT AND THE US INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING, THEY AMOUNTED TO PREACHING TO THE CONVERTED. MINISTERS REPRESENT GOVERNMENTS, AND WHILE HE APPRECIATED THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION, HE COMMENTED THAT MINISTERS HAD TO CONVINCE CAPITALS AND GOVERNMENTS. THE PROBLEM LIES IN GETTING THE MESSAGE TO PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS WITHOUT CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF HYSTERIA AND LOSING CREDIBILITY.

-DANSON CHARACTERIZED THE LACK OF CLARITY OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AS "TROUBLING" AND SPECULATED THAT IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO BE ABLE TO CONFRONT BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN WITH SOME OF THE FACTS HE HAD HEARD THE PREVIOUS DAY. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT LET THEIR PEOPLE FORGET THE DESTRUCTION OF WORLD WAR II AND MUSED THAT PERHAPS THE FIRST THING THE SOVIETS WANT TO DO IS TO KEEP ANY FUTURE FIGHT AWAY FROM THEIR
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TERRITORY. HE EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF SOME WARSAW PACT NATIONS AND SPECULATED THAT SOVIET TROOPS MIGHT BE STATIONED IN THESE NATIONS TO HELP KEEP THEM IN LINE. DANSON SAW A NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISES AND FOR INCREASED STANDARDIZATION, BUT CAME BACK TO THE POINT THAT MINISTERS' REAL JOB IS TO CONVINCE THEIR PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS TO SUPPORT INCREASED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. FINALLY, HE REMARKED THAT HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE ROLE SECRETARY RUMSFELD HAD PLAYED AT THE NOVEMBER NPG IN LONDON AND AT THE CURRENT DPC. HE SAID HE COULD FEEL THE RESPECT FELT FOR HIM AROUND THE TABLE.

5. RESPONDING TO DANSON, LUNS NOTED THAT SOVIET TROOPS STATIONED IN EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS ARE FAR IN EXCESS OF THOSE NECESSARY TO KEEP THESE NATIONS IN LINE. HE AGREED THAT AS MUCH INFORMATION SHOULD GO TO AS MANY PEOPLE IN CAPITALS AS WOULD BE SAFE TO GIVE THEM. HE SUGGESTED AUDIENCES MIGHT INCLUDE PRIME MINISTERS, FINANCE MINISTERS, FOREIGN MINISTERS AND PERHAPS SOME LEADING MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENTS.

6. LATTANZIO WKVITALY) STRESSED THE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY HIS GOVERNMENT FACES, POINTING OUT THAT HIS PRIME MINISTER WAS IN WASHINGTON AT THE MOMENT TO OUTLINE THESE DIFFICULTIES TO THE US GOVERNMENT AND TO ASK FOR AID IMMEDIATELY. IN JANUARY, UNEMPLOYMENT IN ITALY WILL INCREASE BY ONE-HALF MILLION, AND IT WILL NOT BE EASY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ASK FOR FURTHER SACRIFICES FOR DEFENSE. HE STRESSED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO WEAKENING IN ITALY'S COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE; AND ANY SLACKENING OF EFFORT WAS RELATED TO "OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES." IN THIS REGARD, A SLIGHT POSTPONEMENT IN THE AWACS PROGRAM WOULD BE USEFUL TO ITALY. HE CLOSED BY UNDERLINING ITALY'S NEED FOR ASSISTANCE FROM ITS EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ALLIES.

7. PAULS (FRG PERMREP) SAID HE HAD LISTENED WITH GREAT ATTENTION TO SYG LUNS AND TO ADMIRAL HILL-NORTON AND WOULD INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT OF THEIR VIEWS. HE EXPECTED HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD RESPOND THAT THE FRG HAS
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FULFILLED ALL IT HAD BEEN ASKED TO DO, AND WOULD DO SO IN 1977 AND IN THE FUTURE.

-ADMIRAL HILL-NORTON HAD REFERRED TO THE DANGEROUS SITUATION ON THE FLANKS; PAULS FELT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO LOOK AT FLANKS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA AS WELL AS THOSE WITHIN, CITING THE NORTHERN SEAS, THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, AND THE SEAS OFF SOUTH AFRICA. HE FELT THAT THE DANGER OF BLACKMAIL ON THE FLANKS WAS EVEN GREATER THAN IN THE CENTER REGION. HE OFFERED NO THOUGHTS ON SOLUTIONS, BUT SAID THAT THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE EARMARKED FOR FURTHER MEETINGS.

-ON THE SUBJECT OF SURPRISE ATTACK, PAULS POINTED OUT THAT GERMAN FORCES ATTACKING THE SOVIET UNION IN 1941 HAD MADE REMARKABLE ADVANCES WITH ONLY SOME 3,800 TANKS, AGAINST SOVIET FORCES POSSESSING SOME 15,500. THE CURRENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP JUDGES THE PRESENT SITUATION OUT OF THEIR WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCES, BUT WE CANNOT EXPECT THAT THE NEXT GENERATION WILL SHARE THEIR ELDERS' CONSERVATISM. THUS, THE EARLY WARNING PROBLEM WILL REMAIN PERMANENT FOR NATO, TRADITIONAL SOVIET CAUTION NOTWITHSTANDING.

-PAULS NOTED THAT PUTTING MORE MONEY INTO DEFENSE WOULD NOT PRODUCE IMMEDIATE RESULTS, BUT FELT THAT PROPER PREPARATIONS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT COULD HELP OVERCOME CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES. FOR EXAMPLE, BY DEPLOYING TROOPS EARLY IN A CRISIS, COURAGEOUS GOVERNMENTS COULD HELP OVERCOME THE MALDEPLOYMENT PROBLEM THAT WOULD BE VERY COSTLY TO CORRECT IN PEACETIME. FAINT HEARTS MIGHT COUNSEL AGAINST DOING ANYTHING THAT

COULD BE CONSIDERED PROVOCATIVE, BUT THE RIGHT COURSE WOULD BE TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS. DEPLOYING TROOPS IN A CRISIS WOULD CONVINCE THE PACT THAT NATO IS SERIOUS. LIKEWISE, REINFORCEMENTS SHOULD START EARLY IN A CRISIS, BECAUSE ONCE HOSTILITIES COMMENCE SACLAN'T'S FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO NEUTRALIZE ENEMY NAVAL FORCES, NOT TO PROTECT CONVOYS. AS A FINAL THOUGHT, PAULS SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS MINISTERS AND PERMREPS SHOULD REGARD THEMSELVES AS A SORT OF THINK-TANK OF THE ALLIANCE, GOING BEYOND THE ROUTINE WORK
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THEY ARE TO INCLINED TO DO.

8. COMMENTING ON PAULS' STATEMENT, LUNS REMARKED THAT HIS MAIN WORRY IS FAILURE TO TAKE DECISIONS NOW ON IMPROVEMENTS THAT WILL BE NEEDED IN THE 1980S.

9. CONCERNING SOVIET INTENTIONS, FEYZIOGLU (VICE PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY) ASKED, WAS THERE A DANGER OF AGGRESSION? REFERRING TO PAULS' STATEMENT OF THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II ON SOVIET THINKING, HE NOTED THAT NATO FACES A DICTATORSHIP, AND COMMENTED THAT WITH A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO WORLD WAR II. LIKEWISE HAD THERE BEEN A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN GREECE, THE FOLLY OF THE SUMMER OF 1974 COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. HE STATED THAT COMMUNIST TACTICS AND STYLES CAN CHANGE EVEN THOUGH THE GOAL OF WORLD HEGEMONY REMAINS CONSTANT. HE NOTED, TOO, THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INDIRECT AGGRESSION, POSSIBILITIES WHICH ARE GREATER ON THE FLANKS THAN IN THE CENTER. THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT WITH A FAVORABLE FORCE RATIO OF SOMETHING LIKE 3:1, NATO WOULD NOT RESPOND TO INTERVENTION IN YUGOSLAVIA. IN THE SAME VEIN, THE SURVIVAL OF WESTERN EUROPE DEPENDS ON OIL FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE AGGRESSION COULD BE VERY TEMPTING GIVEN SUCH OVERWHELMING SOVIET FORCE.

-FEYZIOGLU RECOUNTED TURKEY'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, NOTING THAT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILL BE CRUSHED BY THE WESTERN INFLATION AND RISING OIL PRICES. THUS, AN INFRASTRUCTURE AUGMENTATION OF \$3 MILLION WOULD BE A GREATER BURDEN FOR TURKEY THAN A \$300 MILLION INCREASE WOULD BE FOR OTHERS. HE STRESSED TURKEY'S ATTACHMENT TO NATO, AND ITS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE TREATMENT IT HAS RECEIVED FROM THE US CONGRESS. ANY TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN CONVINCING THE PUBLIC THAT NATO COUNTS FOR ANYTHING UNLESS THE DCA IS RATIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE AD HOC GROUP ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR PORTUGAL AND TURKEY TO PRODUCE SOME RESULTS. HE COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS THE PORTUGUESE STRUGGLE FOR

DEMOCRACY WOULD HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IF THAT NATION
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SHARED A COMMON BORDER WITH THE USSR AND STRESSED THAT
NATO CANNOT CONTINUE TO ALLOW THE FLANKS TO WEAKEN.

10. LUNS TOLD FEYZINLU THAT HIS CONVINCING, ELOQUENT
APPEAL HAD BEZILEARD BY ALL, BUT THAT HE WAS PREACHING
TO THE CONVERTED, SINCE IN THE US THE EXECUTIVE IS
CONVICRID OF THE NEED TO AID TURKEY. HE ADDED THAT IT
WU INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE ALLIES WOULD NOT RESPOND
IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY IF TURKEY WERE ATTACKED.
FEYZIOGLU REPLIED THAT TURDEY WOULD PREFER AID IN TIME
OF PEACE, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE DETERRENCE NOW, RATHER
THAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

11. ADMIRAL SOUTO CRUZ (PORTUGAL) NOTED PORTUGAL'S
DIFFICULT INTERNAL SITUATION. DESPITE ALL PROBLEMS,
HOWEVER, PORTUGAL HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO NATO'S
NEEDS AND HAD GONE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN THE AWACS
MATTER. PORTUGAL HAD GIVEN PROOF OF ITS DESIRE TO
REMAIN FREE WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE. STILL,
THE PORTUGUESE SITUATION DEMANDS EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE
AND SOUTO CRUZ JOINED FEYZIOGLU IN ASKING THUT THE AD
HOC GROUP START WORK SOON.

12. LUNS REPLIED THAT THE AD HOC GROUP WOULD MEET
SHORTLY, NO LATER THAN THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW YEAR.

13. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS PERMREP) SAID THAT MINISTER
VREDELING HAD BEEN VERY IMPRESSED BY THE STATEMENT OF THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND BY THE US
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING, AND HAD SO INFORMED THE PRESS.
HE WAS CERTAIN THAT VREDELING WOULD REPORT HIS
IMPRESSINGS TO THE DUTCH CABINET AND SUGGEST THAT
CABINET MEMBERS RECEIVE THE NATO BRIEFING. HE HPED
THAT THE NATO BRIEFING TEAM WOULD BE READY TO GO TO
THE HAGUE.

14. LUNS THEN ASKED THE NATIONS INFORM HIM AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE IF AND WHEN THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE
NATO INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING PRESENTED IN THEIR CAPITALS.

15. SECRETARY RUMSFELD REMARKED THAT LAME DUCKS ARE
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SUPPOSED TO QUACK AND WADDLE INTO THE SUNSET, ALTHOUGH
HE HAS NOT QUITE YET LEARNED HOW TO DO SO. STRESSING THAT HIS
REMARKS WERE PERSONAL, HE SAID THAT HE HAD NO PROPOSALS
OR DEMANDS TO TABLE AND HIS OBSERVATIONS WOULD BE

MORE REFLECTIVE THAN FRANTIC.

- FIRST, HE FELT DEEPLY THAT ONE THING THAT HELPS THIS INSTITUTION IS ATTENDANCE. HE NOTED THE PRESENCE OF HIS CANADIAN AND TURKISH COLLEAGUES, WHO HAD COME SOME GREAT DISTANCES TO ATTEND THE DPC MEETING. WHILE RECOGNIZING ILLNESSES, URGENT CABINET BUSINESS AND OTHER DEMANDS ON THEIR PRESENCE, HE STRESSED THAT MINISTERS SHOULD GIVE GREATEST CONSIDERATION TO ATTENDING MEETINGS, OTHERWISE THERE COULD BE AN EROSION OF THE DPC, NAC, AND NPG. HE STATED THIS IN FULL AWARENESS OF THE DIFFICULTIES FACING SOME MINISTERS, BUT BELIEVING THAT THE POINT NEEDED TO BE MADE, HAD DECIDED THAT HE, AS AN OUTGOING MINISTER, SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO MAKE IT.

-A SECOND POINT CONCERNED SURPRISE ATTACK. REFERRING TO RECENT ARTICLES ON THIS SUBJECT, SECRETARY RUMSFELD REMARKED THAT THE NATO ASSUMPTION MUST BE THAT THE WARSAW PACT WILL ELECT THE COURSE IT JUDGES MOST DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR NATO. HE STRESSED THAT NATO MUST BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH A VARIETY OF CONTINGENCIES. THE PRESS HAD BEEN A BIT SHRILL ON THE SUBJECT, BUT HE FELT THAT NATO SHOULD AND COULD EXAMINE THE ISSUE IN AN ORDERLY WAY AND SEE THAT IT WAS PROPERLY ARRANGED TO DEAL WITH ALL CONTINGENCIES.

- A THIRD POINT CONCERNED MAINTAINING FORCE LEVELS. LOOKING BACK TO THE HEYDAY OF THE MANSFIELD RESOLUTION, HE NOTED THE PROGRESS MADE SINCE THAT TIME. THE RESOLUTION HIT A HIGH WATER MARK IN ABOUT 1973 AND HAD BEEN LOSING SUPPORT EVER SINCE. HOW DID THIS COME ABOUT? ONE THING HAD BEEN THE DEEP INTEREST OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE PUBLICATION OF INSIGHTFUL ARTICLES CONCERNING THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FOR LOWERING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. IT HAD BEEN CLEAR THAT WE WERE ENTERING A TIME OF APPROXIMATE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY. REFLECTING ON THE EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL
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REDUCTIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOWERING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION STARTED TO TURN. IT WAS REASSURING THAT SOMETHING LIKE THIS COULD HAPPEN, AND THIS TURNAROUND DEMONSTRATED THAT WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS TODAY BY THINKING ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING ADEQUATE DEFENSES AND HARD WORK.

-THE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS TAKING PLACE IN WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES SHOW THAT THE SITUATION IS NOT STATIC; SOME OF THESE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN GOING ON SINCE THE 60'S, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE CERTAIN DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE LAST THREE OR FOUR YEARS THAT CAUSED PARITUCULAR CONCERN. OUR CONCLUSION MUST BE THAT

SIMPLY MAINTAINING FORCES IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH. SOMETHING MORE IS NEEDED-IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR LEVEL OF EFFORT. THIS PROBLEM IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM PAST PROBLEMS AND IN MANAGEABLE.

-SECRETARY RUMSFELD SAID HE COULD AGREE WITH DANSON AND OTHERS THAT IT IS WORTHWHILE LOOKING AT SOVIET INTENTIONS, BUT THE DANGER IS THAT SOME THEN

CONCLUDE THAT WE DO NOT NEED OUR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, BECAUSE WE CANNOT DEMONSTRATE WITH CERTAINTY THAT THE SOVIETS

INTEND TO USE THEIR GREAT MILITARY POTENTIAL. RATHER THAN PLACING OURSELVES IN A BOX BY HAVING TO PROVE A NEGATIVE, WE WOULD BE BETTER OFF STRESSING THAT WE MUST RELY ON CAPABILITIES. THE REALITY IS THAT THE SOVIETS GIVEN THEIR GROWING CAPABILITIES, WILL HAVE A NUMBER OF OPTIONS. WE CANNOT WITH CERTAINTY PREDICT HOW SOVIET LEADERS MIGHT DECIDE TO EMPLOY THESE OPTIONS.

-ADDRESSING THE SOVIETS' POTENTIAL FOR INTIMIDATION, SECRETARY RUMSFELD CITED THE EXAMPLE OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, WHEN KRUSHCHEV HAD BEEN TEMPTED INTO ADVENTURISM. HOWEVER, FACED WITH US CAPABILITIES, HE HAD BEEN FORCED TO ABANDON HIS INTENTIONS. SITUATIONS INVOLVING INTIMIDATION CAN ARISE AGAIN, AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT PREPONDERANT POWER BY THE SOVIETS COULD PROVIDE AN ADDED INDUCEMENT FOR ADVENTURISM. ADVENTURISM CAN ONLY BE
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DISSUADED BY SUFFICIENT CAPABILITIES AND THUS THE DETERRENT ON OUR SIDE.

-SECRETARY RUMSFELD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AT THEIR MEETINGS, DEFENSE MINISTERS TENDED TO WORK FOR PREPARED PAPERS WITH LAID OUT RECOMMENDATIONS. THEY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH THINGS, SUCH AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE'S STATEMENT, THAT DON'T FIT IN WITH THE NORMAL PACE OF NATO'S WORK. THE FACT IS MINISTERS RELATE TO OTHER PIECES OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR SOCIETIES; EVEN PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS LACK THE POWER TO MAKE INSTANTANEOUS AND UNILATERAL DECISIONS. IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT TURNAROUNDS IN POLICY OR BUDGETS IN FIVE MINUTES, BUT IT IS REASONABLE TO EXPECT AND REQUIRE THAT MINISTERS NOT SIT IDLY BY DOING NOTHING. THEY MUST PROVIDE LEADERSHIP TO CHANGE PUBLIC OPINION. THIS IS NOT AN EASY THING TO MANAGE, BUT THE TASK IS TO KNOW WHERE WE WANT TO GO, HOW WE INTEND TO PROCEED, AND THEN TO DO OUR BEST TO GET THERE.

-NATO EMBRACES THE MOST POWERFUL, THE WEALTHIEST, AND THE MOST TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED NATIONS ON THE

GLOBE; COLLECTIVELY THEIR GNP IS AMAZING. THEREFORE THE PROBLEM FOR NATO NATIONS IS ONE OF PRIORITIES AND NOT OF ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES. SECDEF SUGGESTED THAT HE HAS FOUND IT IS DANGEROUS TO GRAB AT ARGUMENTS OF CONVENIENCE, SUCH AS CITING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES WHEN WE MEAN COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES. MINISTERS AND PUBLICS EACH HAVE THEIR OWN JUDGMENT CONCERNING PRIORITIES: A MINISTER'S TASK IS TO BRING PUBLIC OPINION MORE IN LINE WITH HIS SENSE OF PRIORITIES. SECRETARY RUMSFELD CITED THE EXAMPLE OF ISRAEL TODAY AND OF NATO NATIONS' NATIONAL EFFORTS IN WORLD WAR II, TO DEMONSTRATE THE PRIMACY DEFENSE CAN ENJOY WHEN THE SITUATION CALLS FOR IT. PAYING LIP SERVICE TO THE ARGUMENT OF ECONOMIC INABILITY TO INCREASE DEFENSE EFFORTS INHIBITS OUR ABILITY TO REVERSE THE SITUATION.

-CONCLUDING, SECRETARY RUMSFELD REMARKED THAT FREEDOM IS IN SHORT SUPPLY GLOBALLY AND THAT INTERDEPENDENCE IS THE REALITY OF THE MODERN WORLD. WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL, SECRET

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ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FACTORS IS BECOMING GREATER. NATO HAS BEEN A SUCCESS AND CAN PROVIDE FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE AT PRESENT: MINISTER'S TASK IS TO SEE THAT THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO PROVIDE DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE FUTURE. THE PATTERN OF THE RECENT PAST CANNOT CONTINUE. CURRENT PROBLEMS ARE MANAGEABLE, AND THE ALLIANCE IS STILL CREDIBLE. THE DIFFICULTY WILL BE TO KEEP THIS CAPABILITY, GIVEN THE PACE OF SOVIET IMPROVEMENTS. STILL, HE WAS REASSURED ABOUT THE ALLIANCE. THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION HAD LED TO AN IMPORTANT DEGREE OF COOPERATION, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. NATO NATIONS HAVE GOOD PEOPLE WHO ARE WORKING HARD ON THE PROBLEMS WHICH FACE THE ALLIANCE. HE FELT CONFIDENT THESE PEOPLE WOULD COME UP WITH WORKABLE SOLUTIONS.

16. LUNS RESPONDED THAT HIS KEEN REGRETS AT THE PROSPECT OF SECRETARY RUMSFELD DEPARTURE FROM THE DPC HAD BEEN MUCH SHARPENED BY THE ELOQUENT, WELL-SPOKEN AND FORCEFUL STATEMENT JUST DELIVERED. HE REMARKED THAT ONE OF THE SALIENT POINTS HE DISCERNED IN SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT WAS THAT IF NATO CONTINUED IN ITS CURRENT PATH. IT WOULD RULE ITSELF OUT OF ANY OPTION BUT TO HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT MEAN BUSINESS. HE SHARED THE SECRETARY'S REGRET AT THE ABSENCE OF SO MANY MINISTERS, POINTING OUT THAT ONLY SIX OF TWELVE WERE PRESENT AT THE RESTRICTED SESSION AND ONLY EIGHT OF TWELVE HAD BEEN PRESENT EARLIER IN THE DAY. HE HOPED THAT MINISTERS WOULD ACCORD A PROPER PRIORITY TO FUTURE MEETINGS. STRAUSZ-HUPE'

UNQTE: ROBINSON

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